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ABSTRACT 
Against a background of already thin markets in some sectors of major public sector 
infrastructure in Australia and the desire of the Australian federal government to leverage 
private finance, concerns about ensuring sufficient levels of competition are prompting 
federal government to seek new sources of in-bound foreign direct income - as part of 
attracting more foreign contractors and consortia to bid for Australian public sector major 
infrastructure. As a first step towards attracting greater overseas interest in the Australian 
public sector market infrastructure market, an improved understanding of the 
determinants of multinational contractors’ willingness to bid in this market is offered by 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and which have has been a dominant approach in 
international business for over 20 years and yet has been little used in the context of 
international contracting. This paper aims to develop Dunning’s eclectic framework and 
also gives a brief outline of a research plan to collect secondary data and primary data 
from international contractors around the globe in pursuance of testing the eclectic 
framework. 
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INTRODUCTION   
Given estimates of demand for infrastructure spending of US$53 trillion between 2007 
and 2030 (OECD 2006), a key challenge for governments across the globe is not only to 
fund new infrastructure but at the same time deliver value for money (VfM) in its 
provision. In order to address both these concerns Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are 
being seen as an important part of the procurement strategy in many countries, not least 
of which in the US; UK and in Australia (World Economic Forum 2010; HM Treasury 
2010; KPMG and Infrastructure Australia 2010).  
 
At the same time, although the role of PPPs in leveraging private finance and addressing 
government funding constraints is evident, the extent to which PPPs deliver VfM remains 
a vexed question. To illustrate this, Hodge and Greve (2009) reviews the notable 
evaluations of PPPs from 1998 and concludes that the evidence for and against PPPs 
delivering value for money is at best mixed. Putting aside the debate concerning overall 
question of relative VfM realized through PPPs, there seems to be consensus on the 
importance of the role of competition in ensuring that PPPs have the best opportunity to 
deliver superior VfM relative to other procurement modes (Grimsey and Lewis 2004; 
KPMG and Infrastructure Australia 2010). That is, achieving a sufficient level and a 
balance of competition as part of the process of selecting a PPP bid not only creates 
downward pressure on prices (for example, the service charge) but importantly 
encourages innovation and crystallizes benefits of output specifications and other 
measures designed to improve VfM in whole life terms. Before the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), Runeson and de Valence (2008) observed the emergence of a two-tiered 
construction market comprising the more traditional local/national market and a new 
global construction industry based on high technology and a business strategy revolving 
more around VfM throughout the project's life cycle and fueled to a significant extent by 
procurement modes like PPPs. Runson and de Valence (2008) consider that this market is 
oligopolistic and it seems reasonable to suggest that this market has become even less 
competitive, perhaps towards a duopoly in some sectors - amidst and in the wake of the 
GFC. Indeed and in Australia for example, there are examples of projects that have been 
switched from a proposed PPP to a more traditional funded project due to a lack of 
expressions of interest from PPP consortia. At least in part response to the lack of 
competition in the PPP market, the Federal government has noted its desire to see new 
foreign entrants into the Australian public sector major infrastructure market and in 
pursuance of this, is developing a number of initiatives including trade-delegation style 
meetings and reforms to PPP procurement practice to reduce bid costs (Hepworth, 2010 
and Cameron 2008). 
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On the other hand and with respect the market for major infrastructure procured using 
more traditional government funded modes, although in the case of Australia this market 
may still be oligopolistic (de Valance 2003), this level of competition may be appropriate 
in the range of major projects from say $100million up to the very large end of the scale - 
exceeding $1 billion. That is, it’s important to note that research on the net benefits of a 
greater number of competing firms and more price competition is inconclusive (Layton, 
Robinson and Tucker 2009). More competitors and a high level of price competition can 
lead to short term opportunistic behavior and under investment generally. In contrast, 
particular markets with less competition may exhibit greater technological change, as 
above normal profits can be invested in new special purpose technology. Again, in 
Australia the level of mergers and acquisitions and particularly since 2000 is at least part 
of the evidence to suggest that indigenous contractors in the Australian market for major 
projects are performing well relative to the world class standards (de Valence 2003).  
 
Based on this background, an investigation into the determinants of multinational 
contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure projects is 
warranted from both government and multinational contractors (MNC) domiciled in 
Australia perspectives. On the government’s side, an improved understanding of which 
MNCs are better suited to the Australian market and which MNC are closer to 
contemplating bidding for Australian public sector projects along with surfacing any 
misconceptions held by MNC of the Australian market appears to hold significant value. 
That is, in terms of allowing government to target MNCs from certain countries/regions 
and providing government with the basis upon which it can more effectively work 
towards eliminating any misconceptions in terms of its efforts to increase the 
attractiveness of Australia Public sector infrastructure and attract more Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to this market and particularly in the PPP sector – not least of which 
into economic PPPs including toll roads. At the same time, an greater appreciation of 
relative strengths of MNCs currently operating and not currently operating in Australia is 
useful to government in justifying resisting unduly seeking more competition in perhaps 
the more traditional government funded major infrastructure market in Australia and is of 
benefit to MNCs domiciled in Australia in terms of helping to develop strategies to 
enhance and develop sources of competitive advantage. The effectiveness of these 
strategies is likely to be further enhanced through knowledge gained concerning which 
MNCs not currently operating in Australia and which are the closest to contemplating 
competing for Australian projects. 
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Elsewhere and in pursuance of explaining the determinants of multinational contractors’ 
willingness to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure projects, Rahman, Bridge 
and Rowlinson (2010) summarize the relevance of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of 
internationalisation. Dunning (1989) has explicitly explored the application of his eclectic 
paradigm or OLI framework to the service sector including construction services. 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm has remained the dominant analytical framework for 
accommodating a variety of economic theories concerning the determinants of FDI and 
the foreign activities of MNEs for over two decades (Caves 1996; Dunning 2002). 
Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson (2010) proceed to justify why they consider a federally 
funded research project they are progressing will be the first empirical study to deploy the 
OLI framework to explain in-bound FDI (to Australia as the host country) and using the 
dominant economic theories advocated by Dunning mindful of the nature of the study and 
its context or multinational construction. 
 
Dunning (2008: 99-100) notes that the principal hypothesis of the eclectic paradigm is 
“that the level and structure of a firm’s foreign value-adding activities will depend on 
four conditions being satisfied. They are: 
1. The extent to which it (enterprise) posses unique and sustainable ownership (O) 
advantages vis-à-vis firms of other nationalities, in  servicing of particular markets or 
groups of markets… 
2. Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which the enterprise perceives it 
to be in its best interest to add value to its O advantages than to sell them, or their 
right of use, to independent foreign firms. These advantages are called market 
internalisation (I) advantages… 
3. Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent to which the global 
interest of the enterprise are served by creating, accessing or utilizing, its O 
advantages in a foreign location (L)… 
4. Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a particular firms, the extent to 
which a firm believes that foreign production is consistent with the long-term 
objectives of its stakeholders and instructions underpinning its managerial and 
organizational strategic.” 
 
In relation to generalized predictions of the eclectic paradigm, or OLI framework, 
Dunning (2008: 100) also notes that: 
“At any given moment in time, the more a country’s enterprises – relative to those 
of another - possess desirable O advantages, the greater the incentive they have to 
internalize rather than externalize their use, the more they find it in their interest 
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to access or exploit them in a foreign location, then the more they are likely to 
engage out-bound FDI. By the same token, a country is likely to attract in-bound 
investment by foreign MNE’s when the reverse conditions apply.”  
 
Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson (2010) also explain the logic and selection of theories 
advocated by Dunning and which are to be used in the research project concerning in-
bound FDI mentioned above. Building on this contribution and again with reference to 
this research project, the main aim of this paper is to develop Dunning’s principal 
hypothesis, first to more clearly articulate the four conditions within the context of MNC 
and specifically the reverse conditions to reflect a lack of in-bound FDI (at least in terms 
of observations of a lack of competition in some sectors of the PPP market in Australia 
and an oligopolistic market structure more generally in respect of large scale 
infrastructure projects) and second to address a weakness arising in the hypothesis that is 
based on a nominal (yes or no) approach to the O, L and I factors and which fails to speak 
to the relative explanatory power of these factors. The paper also briefly outlines a 
research plan to collect secondary data and primary data from international contractors 
around the globe in pursuance of testing the developed version of Dunning's principal 
hypothesis.  
 
DEVELOPING DUNNING’S PRINCIPAL HYPOTHESIS  
 
The four conditions (or general statements) are first restated within the context of MNC 
and to reflect in-bound FDI as follows: 
1. The extent to which it (MNCs outside Australia) posses unique and sustainable 
ownership (O) advantages vis-à-vis other MNCs outside and domiciled in Australia, 
in servicing the Australian market… 
2. Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which MNCs outside Australia 
perceive it to be in their best interest to add value to their O advantages than to sell 
them, or their right of use, to independent foreign firms… 
3. Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent to which the global 
interest of MNCs outside Australia are served by creating, accessing or utilizing, their 
O advantages in Australia (L)… 
4. Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a MNC outside Australia, the 
extent to which this MNC believes that foreign production in Australia is consistent 
with the long-term objectives of its stakeholders and instructions underpinning its 
managerial and organizational strategic. 
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The corresponding hypothesis given in reverse terms to reflect in-bound FDI as follows: 
the less Australian-based MNCs - relative to other MNCs - possess desirable O 
advantages, the greater the incentive other MNCs have to internalize rather than 
externalize their use, the more other MNCs find it in their interest to access or exploit 
them in Australia, then the more Australia is likely to attract in-bound investment by 
other MNCs. For ease of reference, these reverse terms are further rephrased to reflect a 
lack of in-bound FDI as suggested in the introduction – at least in terms of some sectors 
of PPP market, thus: the more Australian-based MNCs - relative to other MNCs - possess 
desirable O advantages, the lesser the incentive other MNCs have to internalize rather 
than externalize their use (I disadvantages), the less other MNCs find it in their interest to 
access or exploit them in Australia (L  disadvantages), then the less Australia is likely to 
attract in-bound investment by other MNCs.  
 
Having more clearly articulated the four conditions within the context of MNC and 
specifically the reverse conditions to reflect a lack of in-bound FDI (at least in terms of 
observations of a lack of competition in some sectors of the PPP market in Australia and 
an oligopolistic market structure more generally in respect of large scale infrastructure 
projects), attention is now given to addressing a weakness arising in the hypothesis that is 
based on a nominal (yes or no) approach to the O, L and I factors and which fails to speak 
to the relative explanatory power of these factors. More specifically, whilst there is 
evidence in the context of MNC that demonstrates the significance of these three factors 
in the FDI decision (including Cuervo and Pheng 2003a and b) there is an absence of 
research that reveals the relative importance of these factors with respect to a specific 
industry sector in a particular host country. This weakness can be demonstrated having 
discounted the relevance of the I factor in the context of the research project in this paper. 
Here Rahman, Bridge and Rowlinson (2010) invoked the immobile nature of construction 
and a dependent variable that concerns MNCs bidding for projects as head contractors. 
Such that, the necessity to have on-the-spot interactions with the client, co-consortium 
members and subcontractors and suppliers, means that the issue is not so much if 
internalization occurs but more how much internalization occurs. Indeed, Abdul’s (1995) 
critique of Seymour (1987) seminal work and Chen and Messner (2011) support this view 
in so far as exporting and FDI in service industries like construction can be seen as almost 
inseparable. Moreover, although Abdul argues that licensing is a perfectly feasible 
alternative to FDI, the dependent variable in this research is solely FDI - to be measured 
both in terms of MNCs operating / not operating in Australia (categorical) and MNCs 
views of the level of attractiveness for FDI into Australia (interval/ordinal). The weakness 
in Dunning’s hypothesis concerning revealing the relative importance of the O and I 
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factors only is now demonstrated. That is, top-tier MNCs not operating in Australia with 
O disadvantages relative to those observed in top-tier MNCs operating in Australia (vis-
à-vis a particular sector in the Australian market) and with L disadvantages (facing an 
inferior return/risk profile and including higher levels of home-host/Australia risk) are 
expected to rate the overall attractiveness of the Australian market lower than top-tier 
MNCs not operating in Australia with O advantages relative to those observed in top-tier 
MNCs operating in Australia (vis-à-vis a particular sector in the Australian market) and L 
advantages (facing a superior return/risk profile and including lower levels of home-
host/Australia risk); and in turn these MNCs are expected to rate the overall attractiveness 
of the Australian market lower than top-tier MNCs operating Australia. However, based 
on Dunning’s theory it’s not logical to deduce where in the overall attractiveness 
continuum top-tier MNCs with O advantages and L disadvantages and where top-tier 
MNCs with O disadvantages and L advantages will be situated and ranked between the 
two types of MNC not operating in Australia mentioned above. And the notion that the O 
and L factors can display different levels of explanatory power can be expected – at least 
at the extreme conditions when MNCs have similar O attributes or MNCs are from the 
same location such that the L and O factors dominate respectively. 
 
Addressing this weakness in Dunning’s theory, looks to be a very important practical 
issue for MNCs and their clients as this knowledge would provide the an improved basis 
upon which MNCs can assess competition for a host country and client’s could make 
more effective decisions concerning the extent and manner by which they may seek to 
encourage greater FDI (by targeting either issues associated with firms in the domestic 
market and/or issues associated return and risk for all firms). More fundamentally, the 
ability to generate this knowledge would also represent a significant contribution to the 
overall explanatory power of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. 
 
Hence, the hypothesis is subsequently developed across three propositions that are 
designed to extend the scope and explanatory power of the O and L factors (Dunning’s 
conditions 1 and 3) - contingent on the firm’s motivation (Dunning’s condition 4) and 
having discounted the I factor (Dunning’s condition 2).  
 
Proposition 1 (an extreme condition pertaining to same location) 
With respect to the first condition and component of the reverse/lack of in-bound FDI 
hypothesis concerning O advantages, sources of sustainable competitive advantage 
amongst MNCs within and outside Australia and vis-à-vis a particular sector in the 
Australian market are assumed to be unevenly distributed and associated with MNCs in 
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the top-tier of contractors (Bridge and Tisdell 2004). Thus, in the following first 
proposition, it expected (subject to the firm’s motivation) that: 
 Foreign top-tier MNCs within the same country/region and not operating in Australia 
will display varying degrees of similarity/dissimilarity of O attributes with 
key/common O attributes possessed by both foreign top-tier MNCs within the same 
country/region but which operate in Australia and indigenous/Australian top-tier 
MNCs. The variation in the pattern of the profile of O attributes is expected to match 
the variation in the pattern of overall attractiveness and with no pattern match 
expected between the L factor and variations in the level of overall attractiveness.  
 
Proposition 2 (an extreme condition pertaining to same O attributes) 
The third condition and component of the reverse/lack of in-bound FDI hypothesis 
concerning L advantages is central to the issue of return-on-investment. With respect to a 
particular host market, although all MNCs may face similar upper levels of revenue 
and/or similar costs (arising from the size of the market; governments’ attitudes, polices 
and regulatory framework; industrial structure; resource and manpower quality and 
availability; bespoke costs associated with materials and specified suppliers) MNCs may 
perceive potential returns differently mindful of competing returns achievable at home 
and/or in other host markets. MNCs  also face very different levels of risk generated from 
home-host induced differences. That is, differences arising from cultural, administrative, 
geographic and economic distances (Abdul 1995; Cuevo and Pheng 2003). Here costs and 
associated risks are created by linking the firm and home advantages with the country 
specific advantage of the host country. With reference to the logic of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), Rugman and Verbeke (2005: 13) describe these costs and risks as 
location-specific linking investments and required to bring a new entrant’s operations up 
to a fully productive level and before it can contemplate achieving at least the expected 
normal industry rate of return in the host country. Thus, in the second proposition it is 
expected (subject again to the firm’s motivation) that: 
 Groups of top-tier MNCs in different foreign countries/regions may have similar 
O attributes (at a high through low level of match to those possessed by both 
foreign top-tier MNCs operating in Australia and indigenous/Australian top-tier 
MNCs). The variation in the pattern of the L factor created by the different 
foreign countries/regions is expected to match the pattern of the level of overall 
attractiveness within each group and with no pattern match expected between the 
O factor and variations in the level of overall attractiveness – again within each 
group.  
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Outcomes from propositions 1 and 2 towards revealing relative importance of O and L 
factors 
By adopting the extreme positions and observing differences in the range of the level of 
overall attractiveness down the four columns of MNCs with dissimilar O attributes in the 
same countries/regions (Proposition 1) and in contrast to the range of the level of overall 
attractiveness across each of the three rows/groups of MNCs with similar O attributes in 
different countries/regions (Proposition 2) as shown in Table 1 (preview of part of the 
research plan), evidence is generated to indicate the relative importance of O and L 
factors vis-à-vis a particular sector in the host market (Australia). 
 
 Foreign country 
A 
Foreign country 
B 
Foreign country 
C 
Foreign country 
D 
Operating in 
Australia 
Group 1 
 
 
MNC 1A 

 
MNC 1B 

 
MNC 1C 
 
 
MNC 1D 
Not Operating in 
Australia 
Group 2 
 
 
MNC 2A 

 
MNC 2B 

 
MNC 2C 
 
 
MNC 2D 
Not Operating in 
Australia 
Group 3 
 
 
MNC 3A 

 
MNC 3B 

 
MNC 3C 
 
 
MNC 3D 
 
Table 1 – Case studies 
 
That is, if a greater range of overall attractiveness is observed down the columns than 
across the rows, then this indicates that the O factor is more important and has more 
explanatory power than the L factor vis-à-vis the sector concerned in the host market 
(Australia) and vice versa. 
 
Proposition 3 (full range of conditions pertaining to both O and L attributes) 
In the next section, the rationale for selecting the matrix of foreign MNCs shown in Table 
1 (along with indigenous Australian MNCs) is justified using the technique of analytical 
generalization. This approach uses purposive sampling in order to support claims for 
external validation or generalization of results beyond the cases studied. However, in 
order to make claims for the statistical generalisation of the results a much greater 
number of data points are required and hence Proposition 3 is given to facilitate this 
approach and contribute to the strength of the findings. Thus, in the third proposition it is 
expected (subject again to the firm’s motivation) that: 
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 Notwithstanding the level of match of O attributes possessed by a foreign MNC 
to those possessed by both foreign top-tier MNCs operating in Australia and 
indigenous/Australian top-tier MNCs and in whichever country/region the 
foreign MNC is domiciled, the variation in the overall level of attractiveness 
correlates with, and is explained by, the O and/or L factors/dimensions of these 
factors. 
 
And in terms of helping to reveal the relative importance of O and L factors, it is expected 
that the relative strength of the correlation/level of statistical significance of the O and/or 
L factors/dimensions would be consistent with the outcomes from Propositions 1 and 2 
and once again vis-à-vis the sector concerned in the host market (Australia). 
 
Exception to the propositions 
The fourth condition of the reverse/lack of in-bound hypothesis FDI concerning the 
firm’s objectives or FDI motivation plays an important intervening role in terms of 
determining the MNC’s perception of the overall attractiveness of the Australian market 
with respect to the particular OLI configuration the firm calculates it faces. Rahman, 
Bridge and Rowlinson (2010) summarise the three types of type’s of firm objective/FDI 
motivation envisaged by Dunning (Market seekers ; Strategic Asset Seekers : and 
Efficiency Seekers) within the context of MNCs. Market Seekers (MS) are likely to be 
highly specialized and operating in markets with very limited competition and in sector(s) 
with very large scale capital expenditure. These firms may seek to dominate and impose 
their expertise and may be able to seek lower levels of commitment in terms of the degree 
to which they localize within the host market with higher levels of central control and 
shorter investment timelines along with more mobile entry modes. In sum, these firms 
may seek a highly favorable risk/return profile. In contrast, Strategic Asset Seekers (SAS) 
firms may seek to gain expertise and knowledge from the host market and extend higher 
levels of commitment in terms of the degree to which they localize within the host market 
and lower levels of central control and longer investment timelines, along with more 
permanent entry modes (Anderson and Gatigon 1986). As such, these firms may accept 
much less favorable risk/return profiles. Somewhere between these stereotypical 
extremes, Efficiency Seekers (ES) firms may be faced with spare capacity and seek 
overseas demand to return the firm to its minimum efficient scale in conjunction with 
moderate levels of commitment to the local/host market; control; and a timeline to 
recover investments made neither project-based nor open-ended but rather falling 
somewhere between these extreme types, as well as accepting moderate risk/return 
profiles. As such, the propositions are expected not to hold in respect of MNCs with an 
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SAS motivation – as these firms may perceive the relationship between the overall level 
of attractiveness of a host country and the O and L factors in the opposite direction to that 
envisaged in Dunning’s principal hypothesis and by MS and ES firms. That is, an SAS 
firm may well view a host country attractive despite it possessing O and/or L 
disadvantages. 
 
OUTLINE RESEARCH PLAN 
The research plan is depicted in Figure 1 and comprising four stages concerning four 
home countries/regions, namely China; Europe; Japan; and US vis-à-vis Australia as the 
host market. This plan is next outlined in pursuance of testing the above position 
statements. 
 
Figure 1 – Outline research plan 
 
To make the following changes to this Figure: 
 Delete Step 2 column 
 Delete words "Step 1"; Step 3"; and "Step 4" in other columns 
 Extend down final column to Stage 4 
 In Stage 1 row change brackets from "Public domain" to "public 
domain/external" 
 Changes to Stages and Column 1 
o Change Census of world's top 225 contractors 
o Change Stage 2  and 3 to Stage 2 - "Case Studies (MNCs 
operating/not operating in Australia In four foreign locations) 
  
Population 
Frame 
Secondary 
Data 
(Public 
domain) 
Analytical 
Sampling 
(MNCs in) 
Census MNCs 
out 
 Step 1
Ownership 
advantages 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Data 
(internal) 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Data 
(internal) 
Primary Data 
 
Secondary 
Data 
(Public 
domain) 
Analytical 
sampling 
(MNCs out) 
 Step 4
MNC objectives 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Data 
(internal) 
Secondary 
Data 
(Public 
domain) 
 Step 3 
Location 
advantages 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Data 
(internal) 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Data 
(internal) 
Primary Data 
 
Secondary 
Data 
(Public 
domain) 
Step 2
Internalization 
advantages 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
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o Change Stage 4 to Stage 3 - "Survey" (All foreign MNCs in top 
225)  
 In new Stage 2 row change brackets from "Internal" to "private/internal" 
 
Stage 1 Census of world’s top 225 contractors.  
In this initial stage, the first step is to examines all top-tier Australian-based MNCs (that 
generate more than 50% of their primary revenue/sales from Australian projects) and 
extract these firms from the starting population frame and which comprises the list of the 
world’s top 225 contractors in published by Engineering News Record (ENR). Next, the 
sector that will form the basis of this research (in conjunction with Australian as the host 
country) is identified. This sector needs to be at least monopolistic across the entire 
population frame. Such that it can be inferred that firms in this sector are at least near top-
tier firms. This decision to relax the market structure from oligopolistic to monopolistic 
and from top-tier MNC to near top-tier is justified on the grounds that only a small 
number of Australian-based MNCs appear in the world’s top 225 MNCs and near-top-tier 
MNCs in foreign locations may be equivalent in capability to top-tier Australian-based 
MNCs. 
 
Here, ENR and websites are used to generate secondary data pertaining to the parameters 
comprising: what; where; and how. For example, project type and size; geographical 
operations; and procurement modes offered, may be are used in order to identify possible 
sectors and in which firms’ pricing decisions affect each other and who can be considered 
as operating in at least a monopolistic market structure (Bridge 2008). In order to judge 
whether these sectors are monopolistic, a Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) analysis 
is used to assign the market structure to the sectors and, in doing so, various proxies of 
performance are used including internationalization ratios developed by Pheng and 
Hongbin (2004). The monopolistic sector with the greatest number of MNCs is selected 
for study. In doing so, the population frame (top 225 MNCs less any top-tier Australian-
based MNCs) may further reduce in number to reflect only at least the near top-tier 
MNCs operating in all locations and in the monopolistic sector selected – with a the target 
of at least 150 firms remaining in the population frame. 
 
ENR and websites/annual reports are used to generate secondary (public domain/external) 
data to corroborate the primary data and secondary (private/internal) established from 
MNCs in Stage 2 and which are selected from four foreign/home locations in the 
remaining population frame. More specifically, keywords/phrases are identified to reflect 
MNCs generic capabilities/competencies in respect of the selected sector and which may 
be a proxy for firm specific O advantages. Websites and industry reports are also used to 
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assess industry and home O advantages, along with the application of Porter’s (1990) 
diamond model in terms of home O advantages. Furthermore, this stage uses secondary 
data in relation to the selected sector to analyse the two dimensions concerning return and 
risk making-up the L advantages and this factor’s  contribution to the host/Australia 
industry overall attractiveness (Seymour 1987).  The L’s return dimension is surfaced by 
Porter’s (1985) five forces model and the L’s  home-host induced risk dimension using 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Rugman and Verbke (2005) explain that TCE’s logic 
and variables (asset specificity; uncertainly; and frequency) can be used to reflect the 
influence of country specific investments. Here, asset specificity is measured in terms of 
the cultural; economic; administrative; and geographic differences created between each 
of the home locations and the host location/Australia. And Chen (2008) has usefully 
developed a number of measurements across cultural; economic; administrative; and 
geographic differences. Differences in financial measures, including credit risk ratings 
between home and host locations, are used to indicate likely perceptions amongst MNCs 
in home locations of the uncertainty of doing business in the host country/Australia, 
whilst differences in size of projects/pipeline between home and host location/Australia is 
used to indicate likely perceptions amongst MNCs in home locations concerning 
opportunities to recover and justify country specific investments. Finally, this stage again 
generates secondary data mainly from MNC’s websites/annual reports concerning 
keywords/phrases used to describe MNCs overseas business strategies in respect of the 
selected sector and which may be a proxy for each firm’s objectives/motivation. 
 
Stage 2. Case Studies  
As shown in Table 1, 12 MNCs are case studied, as well as up to three Australian-based 
MNCs. The approach is to begin with local case studies (comprising the Australian-based 
MNCs and foreign MNCs operating in Australian) before proceeding to the overseas case 
studies and which comprise two foreign-based MNCs not operating in Australia in each 
of four foreign locations. One of these two foreign-based MNCs studied overseas is 
selected as the closest rival of the foreign MNCs operating in Australian studied locally. 
In contrast, the other foreign-based MNC studied overseas is selected as being a 
lesser/least rival of the foreign MNC operating in Australian studied locally. Here, the 
intention is to create the greatest opportunity to observe the relative effect of differential 
O advantages across each of the two foreign-based MNCs that do not operate in 
Australia.  
 
Multiple sources of evidence are generated from a structured questionnaire, interviews 
and private internal documents in terms of variables from the Resource-Based Theory 
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(RBT) to indicate the MNC’s sources of competitive advantage and its nature and extent 
of O advantages vis-à-vis the selected sector in Australia. To help operationalise the RBT 
variables, as well as both the return and risk dimensions on the L advantages, empirical 
studies by Pheng and Hongbin (2006) and Cuervo and Pheng (2003 a and b) are adapted.  
Moreover, a semantic different scale is used to capture MNCs’ perceptions of their 
competitive advantage (O advantages); the return and risk (L advantages); and the overall 
attractiveness of the Australian market in the selected sector. Finally in this stage, a 
categorical scale comprising the three sets/ranges of attributes pertaining to business 
strategy; control; commitment and entry mode (based on Anderson and Gatignon 1996 
and Chen and Messner 2009) is used  to assign each MNC to one of the three 
stereotypical firm objective/motivation types.  
 
A key outcome from this stage would be to indentify a MNC not operating in Australia 
with similar/superior O advantages and the same firm objective/motivation as one of the 
MNCs from the same home location but which does operate in Australia. In this case, a 
different risk and return profile pertaining to L advantages is expected to be creating 
differences in the perceived overall attractiveness of the Australian market and it will be 
very useful from both government and contractors’ perspectives, to explore these 
differences and to see whether any misconceptions exist on the part of either or both of 
the MNCs concerned.  
 
Stage 3. Primary data only from top-tier MNCs not operating in Australia  
A structured questionnaire survey is developed that distils and replicates the approach in 
Stage 2 and is administered to all MNCs in the population frame established by the end of 
Stage 1. The aim is to go beyond analytical generalisation used in Stage 2 case study 
approach and to develop statistical generalization and increase the validity and strength of 
the overall findings. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research plan outlined in this paper employs multiple sources of evidence and 
research methods that allow the relative strengths of different approaches to be combined 
to more effectively test the propositions developed out of Dunning’s principal hypothesis. 
A number of theoretical contributions are expected including extending the scope of 
Dunning’s eclectic framework for the first time to the issue of in-bound FDI to Australia 
and in the context of MNC, as well as the development of Dunning’s principal hypothesis 
as reflected by the propositions in this paper. More specifically, these propositions will 
reveal for the first time the relative importance of the O and L independent variable with 
respect to a particular sector and host location, and which is progress that Seymour (1987) 
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indicated would be very valuable and difficult to achieve. And in total, this answers 
Seymour’s call to seek to significantly advance the OLI framework and increase our 
understanding of the FDI decision. The research will also contribute to method. To the 
authors’ knowledge, this will be the first operationalisation of TCE and RBT in this 
context. The research will also yield some very important practical contributions 
including a global map of the relative attractiveness of the Australian market and within 
this map indications of the relative competiveness and productivity of indigenous 
contractors, identification of location factors that can be influenced by government and 
surfacing of any misconceptions of the Australian market. 
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